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THE YEMENI LAW 
AND HOW TO USE IT AGAINST JOURNALISTS 
 
 
Introduction 
The Yemeni written media enjoy a quite important degree of freedom, especially compared with 
the climate in the neighbouring countries and those of MENA region. Nowadays, Yemeni people 
can read more than a hundred newspapers reflecting variety of opinions. Besides this traditional 
press and since around 2000, they can also consult several webzines to get informed themselves. 
Nevertheless, the situation is far from being idyllic. Indeed, even if journalists have been enjoying 
a certain tranquillity to do their job and have been benefiting by the protection of constitution 
and some other laws, the state has been trying since around 1994 to reduce their freedom in 
order to increase its control over them. To do it, power of course uses some “traditional” 
methods in use in the other autocratic regimes: buying silence from “rebels” journalists, putting 
pressure on them, harassing or attacking them. Even if it largely uses the two firsts methods, it 
however grumbles at having to do the last one. It is quite easy to understand. On the one hand, 
western countries, donors and NGOs observe carefully what the state does in the matter of 
human rights and freedom of expression; so if it would torture a journalist, they could threat him 
ceasing economic and development help. On the other hand, “rebels” journalists often belong to 
a political party and/or to a tribe and the state needs these supports to keep control of the 
country. Torturing or killing one of their members would mean for power jeopardizing its 
political future. That is the reason why when it faces a problem with some journalists and fails in 
finding a “soft solution”, it prefers to use a legal way and to bring their case before the courts in 
order to silence them and, furthermore, to keep an appearance of legality and legitimacy. 
 
The purpose of this article is then to take stock of the situation of the Yemeni written press and 
of freedom of expression in the country since the reunification of both ex-Yemens in 1990. We 
will first explain how and in which context Yemeni state has progressively elaborated laws ruling 
the journalistic field. We will then describe how both opponents, say the state and “rebels” 
journalists, struggle and act within or outside the legal system and how they use it in order to 
enlarge their power and/or their independence. We will not list here all the problems which 
occurred between them, but we will at the very most give some representative examples1. Our 
aim is only to show how the system has been working and evolving during that 18 past years; as 
we will observe that it has largely been depending on several national and international political 
and social events during that period. Finally we will analyse the appearance and the development 
of the electronic media and how the e-journalists have been seizing this new space so as to try 
bypassing censorship2.  
 
 
i- From Golden Age to a more Controlled Press 
 
New Laws for a New Country3 
In 1990, North Yemen (Yemen Arab Republic) and Socialist South Yemen (People’s Democratic 
Republic of Yemen) have been reunified to form the Arab Republic of Yemen on May 22nd. 
While both ex-Yemen forbade the multi-party system and, except for official organs, did not 
allow the publication of newspapers, the new Republic and its constitution of 16th of May 1991 
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(amended on 29th of September 1994) authorise the first and enlarge the second; indeed, article 
41 specifies that “the state shall guarantee freedom of thought and expression of opinion in 
speech, writing […] within the limits of the law”4.  
Besides constitution, has been voted a law (Law no. 25 of 1990) ruling the printed media, known 
as the Law for Press and Publications (Law for P&P). Relatively liberal, the chapter 5 imposes all 
the same several limitations on press freedom, the worst being the article 103-l which forbids any 
criticism of the President, specifying that “these provisions do not necessarily apply to 
constructive criticism”.  
But we also have to notice that all bans are far from being illegitimate. Indeed, it seems hard to 
blame banning of defamation, intentional publication of false data, publication of details which 
might prejudice the course of justice or incitement to use violence5. Naturally, if a journalist 
would transgress the law, he would be subjected to a fine or to a period of imprisonment not 
exceeding one year; he would finally to be sentenced to cease his practice of journalism (art. 104 
and 105). 
The Law for P&P reserves also the right to prosecute journalists under other laws like the Penal 
Code which lists several speech offences and crimes, limiting the exercise of freedom of 
expression. Within this legal framework, journalists may be imprisoned or sanctioned by death 
penalty. 
The problem of these laws is not the limits they imposed to freedom of expression, but rather 
that their formulations are vague on many points, like “in the interests of national security”, 
“within the limits of the law” or also “constructive criticism”. Furthermore none of them gives 
clear limits to the practice of journalism (Article 19, 2008, 9 and 13). This legal vagueness can 
give rise to very different interpretations which might be used by power to prosecute and 
imprison insubordinate journalists. And we will see that it happens later. 
 
On the international level, Yemen has lastly signed several conventions. Besides constitution 
which commits Yemen to adhere to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (art. 5), it also 
signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights6, which stipulates and underlines 
the right for everyone to freedom of expression, to information and to hold opinions without 
interference. As a member of the Arab League, Yemen should also have ratified the Arab Charter 
on Human Rights adopted in 2004, and is still expected to do so (Article 19, 2008, 6-7). 
 
Press from 1990 to 2001: from the “Golden Age” to Restriction7 
Right after the reunification and parallel to the creation of new political parties, Yemen has been 
witnessing a rise in birth of several official, partisan and independent newspapers. In this 
euphoric climate, all of them tried taking advantage of the new laws by using the new freedom to 
participate in the public debate. As a matter of fact, the four first years of the new Republic have 
been favourable, according to the Yemeni witnesses, to the spreading and expressing of various 
political, social and economic opinions. It even seems that the state had no policy of censorship 
at that time. 
But quickly, several national problems appeared on the public scenes and Yemeni state put an 
end to what we call the “golden age” of freedom of expression. The first step was the civil war of 
1994. That year, leaders of ex-South Yemen, discontented with the new regime more favourable 
to the ex-Northern state, has tried to secede. The reaction was immediate: Northern troupes 
marched against Southern areas and defeated its armies on July. During fighting, buildings of 
several newspapers close to Socialist regime were bombed, and most of them were forbidden 
after ceasefire for their support to secessionists (what is an unconstitutional opinion regarding art. 
1).  
 
1994 then represents a turning point for press and freedom of expression. Central authorities 
seem to have considered the free press as one of the main cause of the civil war and decided to 
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put an end to the golden age. Besides legal limitations (criticism of unification, the President, 
etc.), Yemeni state also progressively put in place several unofficial red lines of censorship, thus 
delimiting borders of the authorised speech. It quickly appeared that those were the issues more 
or less closely dealing with the President and his entourage, mainly: corruption, nepotism, 
possessions, but also money of oil and criticism towards friend states (among which Saudi 
Arabia). All journalists quickly learnt that approaching these forbidden topics represented a 
certain danger, as power multiplied pressures, threats, aggressions, abductions and killings against 
journalists and newspapers. If one of them would decide to cross these red lines, he would do it 
in all conscience, knowing that he would to assume the consequences. Apart from theses 
subjects, journalists were allowed to write on all the other matters.  
 
 
Thanks to this machinery of the law, Yemeni journalists should have benefited from a quite 
liberal system providing a non-insignificant freedom; if it was the case at the beginning, things 
quickly went bad as we explain it above. ‘Abdurahman Bâfâdhil, a deputy of the opposition, told 
recently that “Yemen had a good constitution and several wonderful laws but which were never 
applied by the government” (Prokop, 2005, 8’48). Concerning the media and freedom of 
expression, this idea seems true for the eleven first years of the Arab Republic of Yemen. As we 
have seen, the state did almost never follow legal ways to silence opponent journalists and 
preferred to use the illegal means we already mentioned. On the contrary, after the 9.11 attacks, it 
has changed its strategy, utilising the law and turning it to its advantage. 
 
 
ii- 9.11 Attacks and their Consequences in Yemen  
 
9.11: a Turning Point for the Freedom of Expression 
A journalist of the Yemen Times analysed the situation of his profession and its evolutions since 
the 9.11 attacks8. He asserted that this event has been a turning point in freedom of expression. 
In order to spare Yemen of being registered in the US list of “rogue states” and to save his 
country from political sanctions, President ‘Alî ‘Abdallah Sâlih immediately decided to integrate 
the camp of Global War on Terror9. This political position has been having strong consequences on 
the journalistic field and on freedom of expression. According to some accounts, several 
journalists received “advices” from officials not to write critical articles against the US foreign 
policy. In spite of the delicate context, the state still succeeded in taking advantage of the 
situation by applying in its own way the paradoxical US slogan: Law and Order, putting the 
emphasis on the second term and leaving aside the first one (Burgat, 2006, 12). Indeed, under 
pretext of order and War against Terror, power threatened and/or started proceedings against 
several journalists having criticised the pro-US Yemeni governmental policy and/or having 
crossed the red-line by any mean. But this policy has its other side of the coin. Though the 
United States prefers dealing with a strong Yemeni power able to control the country and to fight 
“terrorists”, and though they easily turn a blind eye on infringements of democracy, they still 
request from Yemeni government to make progress in the field of freedoms, especially freedom 
of the press and freedom of expression. In that way, power is doing a tightrope walker’s 
performance. On the one hand, it uses the word “order” to improve his power and to muzzle 
journalists, and on the other hand the word “law” requires him to enlarge respect of liberties. As 
the Western states and NGOs keep an eye on it, the second matter appears to him as a priority.  
That is the reason why the authorities have changed their strategy of repression of journalists and 
newspapers since 2001. Whereas before this year they were more inclined to resort to violence, 
now it seems they more and more prefer to make use of the legal way in order to prevent 
international criticisms. In this way, if harassment, threats and assaults against journalists seem to 
have increased10, authorities also have multiplied prosecutions against their opponents who are, 
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most of the time, charged with offences listed in article 103 of the Law for P&P. They especially 
avail themselves of the paragraph l which bounds media’s professionals to abstain “to criticise the 
person of the head of state”, specifying that “these provisions do not necessarily apply to 
constructive criticism”. Besides it, we notice that journalists who have been prosecuted are those 
who wrote on the widespread corruption, who criticised the judiciary and Yemen’s relations with 
friendly countries, who supported political reforms and who analysed Yemeni political situations 
(in North and South) (Article 19, 2008, 16). But when the appeal to article 103 would not be 
efficient enough, the regime would use the Penal Code in order to achieve its ends. 
The route of ‘Abdulkarîm al-Khaywânî, writer and former chief-editor of the weekly al-Shûra11 is 
a representative example of how complicated can be relations between an opponent journalist 
and power, and how the first one tries to circumvent censorship and how the second reacts. His 
problems started in 2004 when he decided to investigate on four very sensitive files and to 
publish his results in his newspaper. Writing on state budget, politicians’ corruption, President’s 
land possessions and nepotism, he knowingly crossed the main red lines. Naturally, the President 
did not appreciate at all that al-Khaywânî entered into power backyards and revealed and 
explained how it works. Al-Khaywânî has been then prosecuted on a charge of defamation and, 
while his articles were well-documented and he was able to prove what he said, his weekly has 
still been shut and he has been sentenced to one year imprisonment; but six months later a 
presidential pardon released him. This decision can be explained by the fact that the President is 
beset between two policies. For the latter, this trial had two purposes: the sentence was destined 
to prove his power in front of the public on one side, as the pardon allowed him to show he was 
attentive to international discontentment caused by this condemnation on the other side. 
By the way, it should be noticed that al-Khaywânî is far from being the only journalist suffering 
attacks from authorities. Indeed, since the second half of 2004 and using the pretext that they 
infringed the Law, they have suspended newspapers, arrested and/or prosecuted journalists, 
publishers, and editors, for the obvious reason that the red line had been crossed. 
 
Toward a new Law for Press and Publications? 
In spring 2004, the arrest and conviction of journalist Sa‘îd Thâbit Sa‘îd led the President to 
decree a revision of the Law for P&P. He publicly and specifically demanded a removal of the 
clause allowing the imprisonment of journalists.  
In fact, it seems that the project of the new Law for P&P has been launched under pressure of 
the international community which tried, by this way, to stress Yemeni authorities on the first 
term of the slogan Law and Order. It means letting freedom of expression grow in the country.  
However and contrary to the hopes of the media community, the revision of the Law for P&P 
has never been completed. The first reason is the lack of organisation of government which has 
not appointed a clear responsible for the writing of the project. Indeed, more or less at the same 
time, each one of the ministry of Information and of the ministry of Justice prepared and 
submitted their project with a complete lack of coordination. When a unique text was finally 
accepted by government, all editorial staffs rejected it, arguing that they had not been consulted 
during its elaboration and that the new text was worst than the current one. Yemeni state tried 
several times to push media professionals to accept it, but they did not yield and continued to 
refuse it. To be stronger, journalists and Yemeni NGOs even mobilised their international 
relations network. Indeed, several international and national organisations (Article 19 notably) 
had caught everyone’s attention in this matter. As a consequence, the President did not dare to 
impose it by force.  
With the passing of time and according to these organisations and to many good Yemeni 
journalists, it seems that the real purpose of this project was more to legalize the present situation 
(i.e. restriction of freedom of the press and recognition of informal red lines) than to increase and 
improve freedom of journalism12. It is also highly likely that the state had taken advantage of the 
international pressure to convert this so-called liberal law into a law tailor-made for him. And yet, 
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the project was planning to remove imprisonment penalty and to confirm or to add several 
positive provisions (regarding freedom of practice of journalism, confidentiality of sources, 
guarantee that journalists shall not face any adverse consequences for their writings). But besides 
it, the draft contained a large number of provisions intending to regulate and to control the press 
and the freedom of expression (notably about what may be published, penal or also economic 
provisions) (Article 19, 2005, 3-4). During the past four years, it had been a chestnut which 
caused much ink to flow despite no (compromise) solution could be found. Finally, the United 
States closed the debate a few months ago. According to our sources, the project was definitely 
given up after the Americans threatened Yemeni state to stop their economic aid if the new law 
would be voted. In front of such a warning, one easily guesses that the law did not weigh a lot.  
 
Yemeni political Trouble and its Consequences on Press 
While President was requesting a new Law for P&P, an internal political issue more or less linked 
with the Global War on Terror was getting started at the same moment. This problem would 
definitely imply strong consequences on journalists and freedom of expression. Thus, Yemeni 
army launched an attack against a former member of Parliament and his supporters leaving in 
Sa‘ada, in the North of Yemen. This manoeuvre, which should have been quick and short, has all 
the same triggered off a civil war which lasted until August 2008. Power justified the war by 
accusing these persons to be rebels and terrorists trying to overthrow the Republic. But real 
reasons of the war are still obscure and two main explanations can be envisaged. First, the leader 
of the “rebellion” expressed, a short time before, several remarks about the bad policy of power. 
Secondly and thinking it would be an easy operation, it is highly likely that the state aimed to kill 
two birds with one stone: on the national level, getting rid of a dangerous political rival, and on 
the international level, including this conflict as part of War against Terror. 
On the journalistic level, it has been having heavy consequences on freedom of expression. 
Besides the official propaganda, some journalists only tried to inform Yemeni people on what 
was really happening in the North. From power side, that was of course unacceptable as the war 
campaign happened to be much less successful than initially expected. As a consequence, it used 
all the palette of weapons at its disposal to force journalists to silence: pressures, physical 
aggressions, bans of printing, etc. But the most interesting for us here is how power used laws 
and adapted the legal system in conformity with its political needs. Indeed, in 2007, authorities 
have started prosecuting journalists under provisions of the Penal Code before the special 
Criminal Court on Terrorism or the Security Court (Article 19, 2008, 9).  
For a state implicated in the war against “terror”, the use of the word “terrorist” is very 
convenient in order to give legitimacy to its struggle against its political opponents. Nabîl Suba‘y, 
Nâyf Hasan and Mahmûd Taha, respectively managing editor, chief editor and correspondent of 
the weekly al-Shâra‘ and ‘Abdulkarîm al-Khaywânî from al-shoura.net wrote in 2007 several 
articles criticising the civil war, giving some details on the course of operations and/or 
denouncing exactions committed by militaries against civilians. These journalists have all been 
prosecuted but charges against the last one are particularly heavy13. He was accused of several 
charges: publishing information weakening the morale of the troops, taking sides with rebels, 
being one of their members, as well as spreading rebels’ propaganda and more or less preparing 
terrorist attacks in Sanaa the capital. All these charges could have brought him to death penalty. 
Sentenced in June 2008 to six years’ imprisonment, he was finally released on 26th of September 
2008 thanks to a presidential amnesty while, at the same time, the mobilisation of the local and 
international associations of defence of the press was raising (Tréguant, 2007 and 2008). But 
according to several persons, the “game” between al-Khaywânî and power has ended. Both have 
used up their “soft munitions”; indeed al-Khaywânî would keep on doing his job (i.e. to inform 
and to explain), authorities would have no other option than to silence him definitively. 
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In this very tense situation, very few journalists make the painful choice of attacking power and 
its system by risking their freedom and life; all the same it is highly likely that their articles are not 
able to strongly impact the Yemeni political scene. If a great majority of journalists then 
compromise and practise self-censorship (Article 19, 2008, 12), others have found solutions to 
continue their work, notably by using the internet. 
 
 
iii- Information on the Internet: Gap in the Law 
 
The Internet, Press and Freedom of Expression 
The internet has been introduced in Yemen in 1996 via TeleYemen and Public 
Telecommunications Corporation companies. But we had to wait until around 2000 to see some 
Yemeni people starting to use the internet as a new tool of information.  
Indeed at that time, the most important traditional newspapers, notably partisan newspapers, 
decided to create information websites for several reasons14. First, they firstly wanted to be 
present in this new space in order to keep their place in the public debate. For owners indeed15, 
creating and financing a newspaper is less a lucrative business than an ideological and political 
action. Though, in order to fulfil their duty of providing information, the launching of a website 
was the most suitable alternative, even if it does not pay. Secondly and as Yemeni printed media 
are very few distributed outside the country, the ownership of a website is a way to get new 
readership and to spread Yemeni news in the Arab world. It represents the best mean to avoid 
logistical problems related to the publishing of printed press; even though they would face several 
issues in the distribution process of their paper, news would come out anyway through their 
websites. It would be all the more easy that journalists writing for the paper and electronic 
versions are the same persons, meaning that the content of both mediums are similar. 
For some opposition newspapers, the internet provides also another interest. For those regularly 
suspended by power, this tool turned into a way to bypass censorship and closures, and thus a 
way to keep on performing their informational work. The internet has thus become a “refuge-
place” for opponents to the regime. Gradually some chief-editors even purely and simply decided 
to stop printing the paper version and to keep on providing the only electronic one. Once again, 
‘Abdulkarîm al-Khaywânî’s case perfectly illustrates both scenarios. Threatened, aggressed, 
judged and imprisoned several times, he decided in 2006 to create a website (www.al-shoura.net) 
in order to be able to publish his articles after power had suspended his paper. But he is not the 
only one in this situation; Nabîl al-Sûfî has also launched his website for the same reasons 
(www.newsyemen.net), and other examples are numerous.  
For several other journalists, creating a website is much easier than launching a printed 
newspaper which requires a licence granted by the ministry of Information. This licence must 
also be renewed yearly and can easily be withdrawn by power if it feels offended by its content. 
Building webzine offers two main advantages: it does not request any administrative formalities 
on one side, and journalists and owners do not suffer the threat of a Sword of Damocles on the 
other side. 
Besides these experienced journalists coming from printed press, some Yemeni people whose 
professional background is not linked to media decided to build their own information site16. 
This very interesting process let to the creation of a new form of media, and Yemen has thus 
been witnessing the rise of a new kind of journalism performed by people who are not formatted 
like media professionals and who are not subjected to the same constraints. That is why they can 
touch on unknown or forbidden subjects in printed media. The more successful one is 
Marebpress.net, a webzine set up by Muhammad al-Sâlihî in 2006 and which became at its very 
beginning the first Yemeni webzine consulted in Yemen17. It should be noticed that at least one 
webzine is Nowadays available in every governorate18.  
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Yemeni authorities and electronic press 
The birth of the Yemeni electronic press has been facilitated by two factors. First of all and until 
now, there is no legislation regulating the information on the internet. Indeed if the Law for P&P 
rules the traditional press and journalists working in it, websites and e-journalists are not 
subjected to it. While a person must have the ministry of Information’s permission to launch a 
new paper, any persons may launch a webzine without any official approval. Furthermore, an 
individual writing articles on the web is not legally considered as journalist. The second factor is 
that the regime had not become aware of the possible impact of this tool on the information 
field, probably because cybernauts were very few at the beginning and still are. Though, it 
gradually realised the oppositional potential of the electronic speech. As a result, authorities have 
been reacting against these so-called rebels “journalists” since around 2006. 
As the ministry of Information has no right to intervene legally, the ministry of 
Telecommunications is the only one being able to control websites. But because of the gap in the 
law, its minister’s position is as weak as the one of his colleague. The only thing he can do is thus 
to filter the content of websites by controlling the internet service providers before or during 
sensitive political or security events, trying at the end to justify the censorship in a more or less 
legal way.  
During the presidential elections of September 2006, the opponents’ electronic media have been 
particularly censored. For instance Nasspress, a website belonging to the Islamist opposition which 
was especially aggressive against the candidate-President, was filtered. The ministry declared that 
“by its exaggerations, this webzine was not a good example for freedom of press”. It seems that 
providing information on the civil war was neither considered as “a good example”. We have 
seen above what happened to al-Khaywânî, but the websites which supported the “rebellion” and 
published photos and movies of battles in the North, showing thus several massacres and 
detailing what was really happening, have also been censured, apparently in the name of the 
national security… But shutting websites is the last level in the repressing process. Once a 
journalist gets too close to the red-line, the regime does not hesitate, as a first step, to appeal to 
political security which then resorts to its old traditional methods of intimidation. That happened 
for example with Marebepress.net in 2007. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Thus until now, even if the state is still trying to increase its control over the independent and 
opponent written press, it has not yet succeeded in silencing it completely. On their side, 
journalists stay on their guard knowing that power will not abandon its aim of controlling the 
oppositional speech. He certainly had to draw back the delicate question of the new law for press 
and publications. Regarding the internet, its appearance in Yemen and its use as an information 
tool by some journalists and citizens, the state has been facing the emergence of an 
uncontrollable and free opinion. Until now, even if the regime does not hesitate to censure 
information websites, it seems it has not been able yet to adopt a clear and efficient strategy in 
order to control its content. However, according to our sources, power is thinking about a new 
plan. Concerning the first issue, it would be writing a new law which would notably forbid any 
criticism against the President. If this information turns out to be true, it means authorities have 
chosen the “best way” to forestall and maybe to prevent objections of international organisations. 
Indeed, as this law would concern all Yemeni people, it means journalists would not be officially 
and directly targeted. The persons we interviewed are all very worried about this new project and 
are still hanging on what will be decided soon. Regarding the second issue, some also suspect 
Yemeni government to prepare a specific law so as to control information provided on the net, 
which represents the only space allowing a real freedom of expression. Nevertheless, the e-
journalists or more generally cybernauts think the regime has not been able to set it up yet19.  
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But the stake is primordial for the state: if it would fail in imposing these new laws, it would 
progressively lose control of the written media and thus of the public speech. In such a disturbed 
political and social context (growing discontents in the South, a recently ended civil war in the 
North, dramatic increase of prices, etc.), oppositions are numerous. For the moment, these 
voices are still unable to make themselves hear and to influence the public debate through written 
media; but if media professionals would succeed in mobilising and thus in pushing government 
to abandon its projects, it would strongly jeopardize the political future of the regime and of the 
President himself in the end. 
In this context and despite the uncertain future of the profession, several journalists continue to 
“play cat and mouse with” power. In the printed press, but above all in the electronic media, they 
keep on carefully crossing the red line by writing on some forbidden subjects, testing by this way 
limits, reactions and tolerance of the regime.  
 9 
References 
Al-Mu’îd, ‘Abdallah al-Wâhâb ‘Alî (1999) Thawra al-sahâfa al-yamanîya, 1990-2000, Markaz dirâsât 
al-mustaqbâl, Sanaa. 
Article 19 (2005) Memorandum on the draft Law on Press and Publications of the Republic of Yemen, 
available at www.article19.org/pdfs/analysis/draft-yemen-press-and-publications-law.pdf 
(accessed on 30 October 2008). 
Article 19 (2008) Yemen: Freedom of Expression in Peril, 08 January, available at 
www.article19.org/pdfs/publications/yemen-foe-report.pdf (accessed 26 October 2008). 
Burgat, Fr. (2006) ‘Le Yémen après le 11 septembre 2001: entre construction de l’État et 
rétrécissement du champ politique’, Critique internationale, No. 32, July-September, Paris, 
pp. 9-21, available at www. (accessed 27 October 2008). 
Chevalier, P. (2007), ‘Informer au Yémen. Les journalistes du Net’, Paper presented at the 
International symposium Nouveaux médias dans le monde arabe: des télévisions satellitaires à 
l’Internet, Lyon, France, 8-9 February 2007 (to be published in 2008). 
Reporters Sans Frontières, Rapports annuels 2002-2008 – Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord, available at 
www.rsf.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=726 (accessed 26 October 2008). 
Tréguant, F.-X. (2007) ‘Yémen: jugé pour avoir osé parler d’une guerre oubliée’, Rue89, 25 
November, available at www.rue89.com/2007/11/25/yemen-juge-pour-avoir-ose-parler-
dune-guerre-oubliee (accessed 26 October 2008). 
Tréguant, F.-X. (2008) ‘Yémen: le journaliste d’investigation al-Khaiwani libéré’, Rue 89, 26 
September, available at www.rue89.com/2008/09/26/yemen-le-journaliste-dinvestigation-
al-khaiwani-libere (accessed 30 October 2008). 
 
Documents 
Constitution of the Republic of Yemen (as amended on 29 September 1994), available at www.al-
bab.com/yemen/gov/con94.htm (accessed 26 October 2008) 
Law Nº (25) of 1990 for Press & Publications, available at www.al-bab.com/yemen/gov/off4.htm 
(accessed 26 October 2008) 
 
Documentary 
Prokop, K. (2005) Yémen. La République des tribus, Coproduction Constance Films/AMIP, France 
 10 
 
                                                
1 For a more complete list of these cases, please refer to the rubric “Yemen” of www.arabpressnetwork.org, 
www.article19.org, www.ifex.org or www.rsf.org. 
2 Most of the information contained in this article have been collected during interviews with journalists or 
politicians within the context of my research of Ph. D. As precaution measures, I do not provide their names here. 
3 See Article 19, 2008, 6-9 to have a good idea of the legal framework dealing with journalism and freedom of the 
press. 
4 In the 1991version, it was written in the article 26 (“the State shall guarantee freedom of thought and expression by 
speech, writing or pictures within the law”). 
5 Respectively article 103, e, h, g and i. 
6 Ratified in 1987 by North Yemen, it has been adopted by the Arab Republic of Yemen after the reunification of 
1990. 
7 For a good study of the Yemeni press in the 1990’s, see Al-Mu’îd, 1999. 
8 Yemen times, February 2006. Article 19 analyses the situation in the same way, cf. Article 19, 2008, 10. 
9 In 1991, the Yemen had criticised the war against Iraq. The United States had “punished” the Yemeni position by 
putting him in the list of “rogue states” and Yemen has suffered political and economical sanctions during several 
years. The Saudi Arabia took advantage of the situation by expelling about one and a half million of Yemeni 
immigrants from the Kingdom. 
10 It is quite difficult to know if they have really increased or not since 2001. According to several international 
organisations (RSF, IFEX, etc.), it seems to be the case. Since a few years, these NGOs have been working in close 
cooperation with several Yemeni organisations for the defence of freedom of the press and expression (The Yemen 
Female Media Forum, Women Journalists without Chains, etc.). These latter well understand they have to 
communicate on the international level in order to catch the attention of those who are able to protect journalists. 
Indeed in their mind, if a journalist is known by some international NGOs, he would face fewer problems with the 
Yemeni authorities. It might be the reason why they write too alarmist reports repeated by the NGOs who do not 
really check their content. Furthermore these Yemeni and international NGOs assert that the situation in Yemen is 
worst and worst but with a short background and no really evidences. However, several Yemeni journalists, who 
have been working since more than ten years, pretend the situation is neither worst nor better, the only change being 
the subjects of forbidden criticism. But if things would really go wrong, it would probably be linked with the 
shrinking of the political field in general. 
11 Newspaper of the zaydî party, the Federation of Popular Forces. 
12 See Article 19, 2005 where both initial projects are analysed. 
13 The three others are still waiting their trial. 
14 We can notably mention: www.26september.info, www.althawranews.net, www.y.net.ye/al-gumhuryah, (official 
websites), www.alsahwa.ye.net, www.nasspress.com, (partisan websites), www.alayyam, www.yementimes.com, 
(independent websites). 
15 There are different kinds of owners: the State, political parties, families or individual journalists. 
16 For more information see Chevalier, 2007. 
17 On 27th of October 2008, it was ranked 23rd on Alexa (figures available on www.alexa.com). 
18 We can quote www.newsyemen.net, www.yamenhurr.net, www.hnto.net, www.hdrmut.com, www.al-teef.com, 
www.al-yemen.org, www.adenpress.com or www.soutalgnoub.com. 
19 If the project of a new law for P&P had been adopted, the electronic press would have been included in the 
paragraph concerning “bans of publishing and penal sanctions”.  
